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Abstract—Smart grid introduces a wealth of promising ap-
plications for upcoming fifth-generation mobile networks (5G),
enabling households and utility companies to establish a two-
way digital communications dialogue, which can benefit them
both. The utility can monitor real-time consumption of end-users
and take proper measures (e.g., real-time pricing) to shape their
consumption profile or to plan enough supply to meet the foreseen
demand. On the other hand, a smart home can receive real-time
electricity prices and adjust its consumption to minimize the daily
electricity expenditure of the household, while meeting the energy
need and the satisfaction level of the dwellers. Smart Home
applications on mobile devices (e.g., smart phones, tablets, etc.)
are another promising use case of smart grid communications,
where a user can remotely control his/her appliances, while he/she
is away at work or on his/her way home. Although these emerging
services can evidently boost the efficiency of the electricity market
and the satisfaction of a utility’s subscribers, they also introduce
new attack surfaces making the grid and utilities vulnerable
to financial losses or even physical damages. In this paper, we
propose an architecture to secure smart grid communications
incorporating an Intrusion Detection System (IDS), composed
of different components collaborating with each other to detect
price integrity or load alteration attacks in different segments of
an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI).
Index Terms—Smart Grid; Smart Home; AMI; IoT; M2M;
Security; Intrusion Detection; Price Integrity; Load Alteration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electric energy and telecommunications are two key in-
gredients to fuel future economy and smart cities, and the
coincidence of the smart grid era with the introduction of
fifth-generation mobile networks (5G) can bring about an
unprecedented opportunity to offer a myriad of promising
mobile applications, notably Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI), Demand Response, Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G), and Smart
Home [1], [2]. In one hand, 5G is revolutionising mobile com-
munications providing pervasive and ultra-broadband fiber-like
experience for everyone and everything to consume emerging
mobile services, such as three dimensional (3D) or ultra-
high-definition video sharing, Machine-Type Communications
(MTC) [3], Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) [4], and
Smart Home[5], [6]. Apart from expected 10 Gbps peak data
rate and accommodating 1000 times more data traffic, hosting
more than 50 billion online things (e.g., vehicles, sensors,
wearable devices, smart home appliances, etc.) is another
prime target for 5G, bringing about the true Internet of Things,
where tens to hundreds of devices will serve every single
citizen [7].
On the other hand, smart grid is transforming today’s power
network to an intelligent grid by radically changing the way
electricity is produced, transmitted, or consumed, supporting
two-way power and information flows between the grid and the
end-consumers. In particular, smart grid entails the expansion
of the legacy control and communications infrastructures, sup-
porting mostly the generation and transmission systems (e.g.,
Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA)) all the
way down to the distribution networks and the end consumers’
premises in order to connect the whole supply chain of the
industry. To this end, AMI is being deployed around the globe
to bridge the gap between the utilities and the end users,
establishing two-way communication links between them. This
will permit efficient and automatic load management or control
and the accommodation of promising smart grid solutions,
notably Distributed Energy Resources (DER) (e.g., wind,
solar, etc.), distributed micro-storage devices, V2G, electric
transportation, and Demand Response (DR) programs [8], [9].
Incorporation of AMI, however, increases the attack surface
and makes the grid more vulnerable to potential cyberattacks
from malicious users to sabotage electricity infrastructure,
cause blackouts, or incur financial losses for either the con-
sumers or the utilities [10], [11], [12]. To address these
challenges, we need to revisit the existing security measures
taking into account not only the information security (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) but also the impacts
of potential security breaches on the stability and security of
the power supply [13], [14], [15]. We should also take into
consideration that unlike the legacy SCADA systems, which
are mostly proprietary-based solutions, AMIs are predomi-
nantly Internet-based networks, creating new attack vectors
for any malicious user who simply has access to the Internet.
In this paper, we propose a secure network architecture
to protect the grid against price integrity or load alteration
attacks. The main component of the network architecture is
an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) distributed at different
parts of the network, including Home Area Network (HAN),
Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN), and AMI constructing
a collaborative IDS. It can exploit signature-based, Machine
Learning (ML), or Statistical techniques to build normal
profiles for communications or for electricity consumption
at different parts of the power network. Measuring these
attributes in real-time and contrasting them against these
normal profiles, the IDS will detect any intrusion in order to
take proper security measures to neutralise potential threats.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II
reviews the related work. Section III illustrates smart grid
communications, and Section IV highlights their potential
vulnerabilities against cyberattacks. Section V presents our
proposed IDS to detect any potential intruder and to take
appropriate security measure in case an anomaly is detected.
Finally, Section VI concludes this paper and draws guidelines
for future research.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous research efforts to address security attacks on smart
grids can be attributed to three major streams: attacks on
SCADA systems, attacks on power market operations, and
attacks on AMI and DR programs [16].
Attacks on SCADA systems have widely been investigated.
Among others, Liu et al., in [17], study false data injection
attacks against state estimation in power systems. In [18],
the authors study how attackers can launch a coordinated
data injection attack to circumvent the bad data detection
algorithms. In [19], Esmalifalak et al. study bad data injection
attack and defence mechanisms in electricity markets.
As for the second stream, there are several previous research
efforts addressing either Denial-of-Service (DoS) or integrity
attacks on the operation of power markets, notably Li and Han,
in [20], address a jamming attack against the price signalling,
where the attacker keeps jamming the price signal until the
demand is adequately altered in a predictive direction. Then,
the attacker ceases jamming and lets the market reach a new
equilibrium. Capitalizing on the likelihood of short-term price
drop (rise), the attacker can make profit by selling (buying)
short in the market. Addressing a different type of attack,
in [21], Xie et al. investigate integrity attacks on the market
operation quantifying potential profits for the attacker as well
as the revenue loss for a utility from launching such attacks.
Finally, the last thread of work on smart grid security is ded-
icated to attacks against AMI and demand-side management
(DSM) programmes. Lying in this stream, Ma et al. study
the impact of a DoS attack on demand bidding information
submitted by consumers to influence the electricity prices
towards their own benefit [22]. Tan et al., in [23], research
the impact of two specific types of integrity attacks on real-
time prices advertised to the smart meters, namely scaling and
delay attacks. In the former the prices are compromised by a
scaling factor, while in the latter, they are corrupted by the
timing information so that the meters will use the old prices.
They show that the stability of a Real-Time Pricing (RTP) pro-
gramme can seriously be threatened if the adversary reduces
the price or provides an old price to over half of the consumers,
e.g., by delaying the price signal. Furthermore, Mohsenian-
Rad and Leon-Garcia, in [16], address an Internet-based load
altering attack on distribution networks and evaluate its impact
on overflowing the distribution lines.
As power grid is getting more and more interconnected
utilising modern ICT solutions, intrusion detection becomes
an important concern for the grid’s safety and stability. An
experiment was conducted by US Department of Energy in
March 2007, where an attack is remotely launched against
the control system of a generator destabilising and forcing
it to shake and smoke [24]. In general, there are three main
techniques for IDS, namely signature-based, anomaly-based
and specification-based. The first approach looks for known
patterns of malicious behaviour using a database of predefined
signatures. The second approach is based on constructing a
profile from normal behaviour using ML or statistical algo-
rithms and detecting any deviation from this normal profile
using statistical measures. Finally, the last approach is based
on setting logical rules and specifications [25]. The authors,
in [25], study the threats targeting AMIs by highlighting
practical needs for an IDS. Furthermore, the authors in [26]
discuss the security requirements and vulnerabilities of AMI
and propose an IDS for the NAN (Fig. 3). Zhang et al. in
[27] propose a distributed IDS for AMIs incorporating Support
Vector Machine (SVM) and Artificial Immune System (AIS).
However, despite these studies, our knowledge about mecha-
nisms to detect integrity attacks on price signal and appropriate
measures to counteract against such attacks is far from being
complete.
III. SMART GRID COMMUNICATIONS
A. Demand Response and Real-Time Pricing
Economists have long advocated that exposing consumers
to the real-time price fluctuations in the wholesale electric-
ity market can considerably enhance the market’s economic
efficiency [28]. To this end, RTP programmes advertise real-
time prices to the end-users and monitor their instantaneous
consumption [29], [2]. This entails the expansion of the legacy
control and communications infrastructures supporting mostly
the generation and transmission systems (e.g., SCADA), all
the way down to the distribution networks and consumers’
premises in order to connect the whole supply chain of the
industry. To this end, AMI [25] is being deployed around the
globe to bridge the gap between the utility companies and the
end users, establishing two-way communication links between
the distribution companies and the consumers’ facilities. This
will permit the grid to efficiently match the supply and demand
and to accommodation promising technologies such as DERs
(e.g., wind, solar, etc.), distributed micro-storage devices,
electric transportation, and DR programmes [8], [9].
B. M2M Communications and IoT Solutions for Smart Grid
Capitalising on Machine-to-Machine (M2M) communica-
tions and Internet-of-Things (IoT) solutions, smart grid is
transforming legacy power systems to an intelligent network. It
is connecting stakeholders across the whole supply chain of the
electricity industry spanning from generation units and substa-
tions to electric utilities and end consumers enabling the grid to
Fig. 1. Smart grid; solid and dashed lines depict the power and information
flow, respectively.
Fig. 2. Home Area Network (HAN)
operate more efficiently and more reliably [9], [30] (see Fig.
1). M2M communications and IoT solutions are to connect
smart buildings and smart homes as well as their appliances
through a Smart Home Energy Management System (HEMS),
serving as a gateway, to a utility company’s command and
control centre at the power distribution network level [31]
as illustrated by Fig. 2. Two-way M2M communications are
being established between households and electric utilities to
help better utilise electricity infrastructure supporting smart
metering, demand response, and the integration of distributed
energy resources into the grid, among others. Utilities will be
able to set a more dynamic time-dependent or even demand-
dependent tariff, e.g., Time-of-Use (ToU), Critical Peak Pric-
ing (CPP), RTP, etc., to influence consumers’ consumption
habit. They might monitor total demand in real-time and based
on demand and supply variations, alter short-term retail prices
to either encourage or discourage users to consume energy
in a given interval. On the other hand, smart appliances can
receive price information in or close to real-time and based
on it and the user’s preferences, can choose optimal intervals
for their operations so as to minimise the energy cost of
the household without compromising the satisfaction level of
inhabitants [32].
An AMI consists of a WAN connecting several NANs (Fig.
3) to a utility company where the consumers in each neigh-
bourhood are connected through a collector that aggregates the
metering or demand bidding information from its HAN clients
Fig. 3. Neighbourhood Area Network (NAN)
Fig. 4. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
[33] (see Fig. 4). In order to have a common terminology,
throughout this paper, we refer to those communication links
that connect the collectors to the HANs as access links, while
referring to the links connecting the collectors to the WAN as
backhaul links.
C. Smart Metering
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is the underpin-
ning communication infrastructure for smart grid. Apart from
cost efficient automatic metre reading, it allows carrying
critical control signals, as well as billing information, from the
control centre to the consumers and more granular interval me-
tering information (e.g., measured every 15 min, half-hourly,
hourly, etc.) in the reverse direction. This real-time monitoring
of the energy consumption can help utilities stabilise the
voltage and frequency throughout the grid to ensure the
necessary power quality at the consumers premises. It further
allows them to detect any unauthorised usage in a timely and
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT APPROACHES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
Signature ML Statistical
Complexity Low Moderate-High Low-Moderate
Privacy issues Yes No No
Accuracy High Moderate Moderate
Unknown attacks No Yes Yes
efficient manner. On the other hand, this interval metering
along with real-time interactions between utilities and their
subscribed users can increase the energy efficiency awareness
of the users and help implement energy conservation policies,
in case of supply shortage.
AMI can help the adoption of distributed micro storage (e.g.,
using batteries) [34] to store energy when there is an excess
of supply and consume it or even sell it back to the grid when
there is a supply deficit. The users may also harvest energy
from renewable sources such as wind or solar, run a micro
CHP unit, or even use their EVs as a mobile storage unit
for electricity to more actively participate in demand response
programmes (i.e., V2G) [35], [36], [37]. In this regard, it is
essential to integrate these renewable resources taking into
consideration the intermittent nature of these resources [38]
and to develop charging/discharging strategies for distributed
storage units or for EVs so as to assure the grid’s stability.
IV. SECURE NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
The introduction of AMI, however, makes the grid easily
accessible and vulnerable to potential cyberattacks from ma-
licious users. For instance, an attacker may launch a Denial
of Service (DoS) or a false data injection attack against the
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system or
against different parts of AMI, including HAN, NAN, and
WAN either to mislead the controller and destabilise the grid
or to cause physical damage or financial losses. To address
these security concerns, in this section, we describe our secure
network solution with an IDS distributed in different parts of
the information network supporting a smart grid.
An intruder may attack different parts of an AMI, depending
on her resource availability. For instance, she might have
limited resources and so target only a limited number of
links or specific part of the AMI. That is, the attack may
target only the access links of a NAN or backhaul links or
even a HAN. Serving to a DR program (e.g., RTP, CPP,
etc.), these access links carry the pricing information from the
utility company to HANs, while carrying back the quantity
of electricity consumed by the households. Providing HAN,
NAN, or WAN with an IDS can help improve system security
by detecting intrusions.
An IDS is responsible for detecting any security breach.
The signature-based techniques rely on known patterns in
the communication packets based on the first few bytes of
the packet payload and are mostly used by propriety based
solutions, where an updated list of signatures for any known
security attack is maintained, and the signature of a given
packet is always contrasted against these signatures. However,
these techniques suffer from two major drawbacks: (i) they
might violate user privacy due to checking packet payloads;
and (ii) they are vulnerable against new attacks since they lack
any signature in the database. Table I summarises the main
techniques for intrusion detection, highlighting their strengths
and shortcomings.
To alleviate these problems, statistical and ML based learn-
ing algorithms are increasingly incorporated by IDSs, where
a set of training data is used for training a learning algorithm.
A trained statistical algorithm builds a normal profile for
the features and contrasts any given example against this
normal profile to see whether it represents an anomaly or
not. On the other hand, an ML algorithm requires training
examples from both normal and compromised behaviour and
classifies training examples into classes using supervised or
unsupervised learning algorithms. These techniques can also
be exploited for learning the statistics of the voltage or fre-
quency of the AC power at different distribution buses to detect
any anomaly in the system. For instance, if the attacker tries
to run many high consumption loads at the same time, it can
be detected by monitoring the frequency of the system, which
is normally 50 Hz or 60 Hz depending on the region. Any
drop from this base frequency implies excess in demand and
consequent deterioration in the power quality which should be
compensated by bringing enough capacity on line or isolating
the attacked region from the grid. Therefore, the IDS monitors
the demand and supply balance in real time and checks if there
is any sudden increase (drop) in the demand, which in turn
implies the existence of price or load alteration attack in the
AMI.
As illustrated by Figs. 5, 6, and 7, different IDS systems
can be designed for different parts of an AMI, where these
components can collaborate for further performance improve-
ment. For instance, when an anomaly is detected in one part
of the network, the associated IDS can report it to other
IDSs in order to take appropriate actions at different layers of
AMI (i.e., HAN, NAN, and WAN). As smart grid paves the
way towards a competitive electricity market, price integrity
attacks can seriously harm the demand and supply balance,
leading to grid instability which may impact the economy
and life by causing blackouts across a large geographic region
or catastrophic consequences of physical damages to different
parts of the grid.
V. CONCLUSION
As a concrete example of IoT, smart grid is about to
attract a considerable market for 5G, helping electric utilities
better manage electricity supply and demand and residential
consumers better manage their energy consumption and expen-
diture. The smart grid will not only be reliant on mature M2M
and IoT technologies as the enabler to support effective remote
management and demand response, but will also require new
approaches to ensure system security as the grid is increasingly
connected to the Internet. However, the introduction of this
supporting information network introduces new attack vectors
raising security concerns for the grid. In this paper, we
Fig. 5. HAN with IDS
Fig. 6. NAN with IDS
Fig. 7. AMI with IDS
discussed how incorporation of an IDS can help improve these
security concerns and proposed a secure network architecture
for AMI to detect attacks against the integrity of price or
consumption information exchanged between a utility and its
subscribed users. For future work, we plan to design and
implement an IDS distributed in different parts of the AMI
in order to detect DoS attacks and false price injection attacks
on demand response programmes.
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